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Torts
by Deron R. Hicks*
and
Jacob E. Daly**
I.

DOG BITE

During the 1998-1999 survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals
issued its decision in Supan v. Griffin,1 which effectively ended the
"first bite" rule as it had previously been applied in Georgia in actions
for damages arising from a dog bite.2 Prior to the decision in Supan,
Georgia courts had traditionally held that, until a domesticated animal
actually bites a human being, the owner of that animal could not be
charged with knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensity. In
Supan, however, the court of appeals rejected that narrow rule in favor
of a much broader analysis of the animal owner's knowledge of the
animal's temperament and disposition.3 In Clark v. Joiner,4 the court
of appeals reaffirmed the broader analysis adopted in Supan and

* Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.F.A., 1990); Mercer University, Walter F. George School
of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Law Clerk for the Honorable Duross Fitzpatrick, Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia. University of Virginia (B.A., 1993); Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2000).
The views expressed in this Article are the personal opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C.; its
clients; or Judge Fitzpatrick.
1. 238 Ga. App. 404, 519 S.E.2d 22 (1999).
2. Id. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23; see also Deron R. Hicks & Mitchell M. McKinney, Torts,
51 MERCER L. REV. 461,482-86 (1999); CHARLES R. ADAMS III & CYNTHIA TRIMBOLI ADAMS,
GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 26-3(b), at 459 (1999 ed.) ("This doctrine has given rise to the

popular, although not legal, maxim 'that every dog is entitled to its first bite[,]'... [which]
is actually a variant of the 'superior knowledge' rule employed in premises liability cases.").
3. 238 Ga. App. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
4. 242 Ga. App. 421, 530 S.E.2d 45 (2000).
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reversed the trial court's failure to grant summary judgment for
defendants.5
In Clark plaintiff went to defendants' home to sell defendants an
insurance policy. As plaintiff was approaching defendants' home,
defendants' dog ran toward plaintiff. Apparently, plaintiff did not view
the action of the dog as hostile but as a sign of playfulness. When
plaintiff put his hand out to keep the dog from jumping on him, the dog
bit plaintiff's hand. The record established that defendants had no
knowledge that the dog had previously bitten anyone. Nonetheless,
testimony was presented that the dog had previously acted in an
aggressive manner toward an animal control officer who had tried to
remove a stray dog in heat from under defendants' porch. The record,
however, also revealed that defendants were not at home at the time of
the incident with the animal control officer and were apparently
unaware of the dog's aggressive behavior on that occasion.6
According to the court of appeals, "[in order to support an action for
damages under [section 51-2-7 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.")] it must be shown that the dog was vicious or dangerous
and that the owner knew it." 7 Further, "[tihe dog's nature and the
owner's knowledge are two separate issues, and proof of both is
necessary for recovery. " ' The court of appeals then noted that Georgia
has traditionally adhered to the "first bite" rule in evaluating "whether
a dog owner has knowledge that his dog has the propensity to bite
someone." 9 The court acknowledged, however, that recent cases,
including Supan, have dealt with "whether the owner had 'prior
knowledge of his dog['s] tendency to attack humans' and 'superior
knowledge of his dog's temperament."'1 ° Notwithstanding this broader
analysis, the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's claim on the basis that
plaintiff had failed to introduce any "evidence that this dog had ever
bitten anyone before and also ... introduced no evidence that the dog
had a tendency to attack humans or that [defendants] had any
knowledge about the dog's temperament that would have put them on

5. Id. at 423, 530 S.E.2d at 47.
6. Id. at 421-22, 530 S.E.2d at 46-47.
7. Id. at 422, 530 S.E.2d at 46. Section 51-2-7 provides, in part,
A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who,
by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury
to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable
in damages to the person so injured.
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (Supp. 2000).
8. 242 Ga. App. at 422, 530 S.E.2d at 46.
9. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 47.
10. Id. at 423, 530 S.E.2d at 47 (quoting Supan, 238 Ga. App. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 22).
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notice that the dog would bite someone."" Accordingly, the court of
appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. 2
The decision in Clark, however, should be contrasted with the decision
reached by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Thurmond v. Saffo.' In
Thurmond defendants kept their German Shepard-Chow mixed-breed
dog on a chain in their garage. Plaintiff, who had known the dog since
it was a puppy and had never had any prior problems with the dog, was
entering defendants' home through the garage when she was bitten by
the dog. As in Clark, there was no evidence that the dog had ever bitten
anyone prior to the incident at issue. There was, however, evidence of
a prior occurrence in which the dog had walked slowly toward another
individual and barked, but the individual involved managed to avoid the
dog without incident. Moreover, the individual testified that on the prior
occasion the dog did not growl, snap, attack, or bite. In contrast to the
facts in Clark, however, the evidence established that defendants had
knowledge of the prior incident. The trial court subsequently granted a
directed verdict in favor of defendants. 4 The court of appeals reversed."1
Citing to the decision in Supan, the court of appeals noted that "the
true test of liability is the owner's 'superior knowledge of his dog's
temperament.'"'" Based on evidence of the prior incident, the court of
appeals held that insofar as defendants were aware that the dog tried
to "attack" another person, the jury should have been allowed to
determine whether defendants "should have anticipated the subsequent
successful attack on [plaintiff]." 7
As in Supan, it is apparent in Thurmond that the court of appeals
draws attention to the particular breed of dog at issue. While the
decision in Thurmond does not rest in any manner upon a finding that
the dog was of a breed known to have dangerous propensities, the court's

11. Id.
12. Id. Special attention should be paid to Judge Ruffin's concurrence in Clark. In his
concurrence, Judge Ruffin argues that the court should explicitly reject the "first bite" rule
as traditionally applied in Georgia. Id. at 424, 530 S.E.2d at 48 (Ruffin, J., concurring
specially). Although Judge Ruffin acknowledges that recent decisions, including Supan,
have expanded the traditional rule, it is apparently his contention that the liability of an
animal owner should be more akin to strict liability than to an analysis of the owner's prior
knowledge of a dangerous propensity. See id.; see also ADAMS &ADAMS, supra note 2, § 263(b).
13. 238 Ga. App. 687, 520 S.E.2d 43 (1999).
14. Id. at 687-88, 520 S.E.2d at 43-44.
15. Id. at 687, 520 S.E.2d at 43.
16. Id. at 688, 520 S.E.2d at 44 (quoting Supan, 238 Ga. App. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 22).
17. Id.
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identification of the breed in its decision-a fact that would otherwise
appear to be irrelevant-could be interpreted as a factor that the court
may consider in future cases when assessing the owner's knowledge of
a dog's propensity to bite.
II.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Can a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress rest upon a
harsh performance evaluation by an employer when the employer has
knowledge of the employee's delicate mental condition at the time of the
evaluation? According to the decision of the Georgia Court 19of Appeals
in Jarrardv. United Parcel Service, Inc.,'8 the answer is no.
After six weeks of medical leave for psychiatric care, Michael Jarrard
returned to his job at United Parcel Service ("UPS").2 On his first day
back to work, Jarrard was required to sit through a twenty-minute
"stinging evaluation of his job performance at UPS for the three months
preceding the leave."21 Viewed in a light most favorable to Jarrard, the
record established that the supervisor who conducted the performance
evaluation knew of Jarrard's prior psychiatric care and smirked during
the course of the evaluation, even though Jarrard "repeatedly begged in
tears that the evaluation be postponed because of his mental weakness."22 The supervisor also threatened to terminate Jarrard if he left
the evaluation and, during the course of the evaluation, questioned
Jarrard's loyalty and integrity.2" Subsequent to the evaluation, Jarrard
"experienced a complete mental breakdown from which he has not
recovered."24
Jarrard subsequently brought suit against UPS for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted UPS's motion for
summary judgment, and Jarrard appealed. 5 On appeal, the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.26
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals first
noted that the four essential elements of an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are as follows: "'(1) The conduct must be

18. 242 Ga. App. 58, 529 S.E.2d 144 (2000).
19. Id. at 58, 529 S.E.2d at 146.
20. Id.

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 58-59, 529 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 58, 529 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 63, 529 S.E.2d at 149.
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intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and
the emotional distress; and (4) The emotional distress must be severe.'" 27 The sole issue on appeal, however, was whether the facts as
viewed in a light most favorable to Jarrard satisfied the second element
of the test-whether the conduct of Jarrard's employer was sufficiently
outrageous.28
According to the court of appeals, as a general rule, derogatory
comments in the employment context do not fall within the category of
extreme and outrageous conduct.29 In particular, the court of appeals
recognized that performance evaluations are an accepted employment
practice.3 0 As a basis for comparison, the court of appeals noted that
the termination of an employee, although unquestionably stressful,
generally falls outside the definition of extreme and outrageous conduct
for purposes of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."1
For this reason, the court held the "lesser act" of providing
a poor job
2
evaluation would likewise fail to meet this standard.
The court of appeals recognized that the employer's knowledge of the
employee's particular mental condition may, under appropriate
circumstances, be a factor to be considered by the finder of fact in
determining whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous.3 3
However, the court held that because the underlying conduct-the
performance evaluation-is an accepted business practice, the mere fact
that the employer knew of the employee's delicate mental condition is
not sufficient to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.34 As the court of appeals noted,

27. Id. at 59, 529 S.E.2d at 146 (quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Moore, 238 Ga. App.
376, 377, 519 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1999)).
28. Id. As the Georgia Court of Appeals noted in its 1999 decision in Moore, "The rule
of thumb in determining whether the conduct complained of was sufficiently extreme and
outrageous is whether the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community
would arouse her resentment against the defendant so that she would exclaim 'Outrageois!'
238 Ga. App. at 377, 519 S.E.2d at 17.
29. 242 Ga. App. at 59, 529 S.E.2d at 146.
30. Id., 529 S.E.2d at 147. "'Comments made within the context of one's employment
may be horrifying or traumatizing, but are generally considered a common vicissitude of
ordinary life.'" Id., 529 S.E.2d at 146-47 (quoting Biven Software v. Newman, 222 Ga. App.
112, 113-14, 473 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1996)).
31. Id. at 59-60, 529 S.E.2d at 147.
32. Id. at 60, 529 S.E.2d at 147.
33. Id. at 62, 529 S.E.2d at 148.
34. Id., 529 S.E.2d at 149.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

[Tihere is nothing inherently outrageous with subjecting an employee
to a straightforward if harsh evaluation of his job performance,
regardless of its timing. Forthright evaluations are to be expected,
indeed encouraged. Perhaps it is Christmas, and a firing or poor job
evaluation would devastate the employee who may be known to be.
experiencing holiday depression. Such may be poorly timed; it may be
tactless and insensitive; it may be rude, inconsiderate, and unkind.
But a negative performance review is not innately wrong or outrageous
and is certainly less negative than an outright termination, which is
not outrageous conduct under Georgia law. Georgia recognizes
negative evaluations as one of the common vicissitudes of ordinary
life.3 5
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals noted that much of the
argument set forth by plaintiff focused on "evidence of malicious motives
of UPS to retaliate for former conflicts between Jarrard and UPS
management about demotions, transfers, and following through on
company promises."36 The court held, however, that evidence as to
malicious intent is relevant "to the first element of the tort (acting
intentionally or recklessly) and does not address the second element of
whether the conduct was itself extreme and outrageous. " "
III.
A.

PREMISES LIABILITY

Slip and Fall

Since the Georgia Supreme Court's 1997 decision in'Robinson v.
Kroger Co.,38 the Georgia Court of Appeals has struggled to define the
proper scope and application of the new standard for summary judgment
in slip-and-fall cases as articulated in Robinson.3 9 In particular, the
decision in Robinson severely limited the ability of defendants to secure
summary judgment based upon the second prong of the Alterman Foods,
Inc. v. Ligon4 ° test.41 As set forth in Alterman Foods, to prove negligence in a foreign substance slip-and-fall case, the plaintiff is required
to establish (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge
of the foreign substance, and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of
the foreign substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 60, 529 S.E.2d at 148.
Id.
268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
See Hicks & McKinney, supra note 2, at 461.
246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
268 Ga. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
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was prevented from discovering it.42 Based in large part on the
Georgia Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Lau's Corp. v. Haskins," the
burden of proof on motion for summary judgment in slip-and-fall cases
weighed heavily against the plaintiff and in favor of the owner or
occupier of the premises at issue. Combined with an increasing
willingness on the part of trial and appellate courts to weigh evidence
regarding the plaintiff's exercise of due care, summary judgment under
the second prong of the test became increasingly common.
This trend abruptly changed with the supreme court's decision in
Robinson. In Robinson the supreme court held that, except in the most
extraordinary of cases, the issue of whether the plaintiff exercised
ordinary care for his or her own safety (that is, whether the second
prong of the Alterman Foods test has been satisfied) is a jury quesAt least with respect to the application of the decision in
tion."
Robinson to cases arising from a foreign substance slip and fall, the
scope of the decision in Robinson has been somewhat confined to the
second prong of the Alterman Foods test. As a result, the burden of
proof on motion for summary judgment as to the first prong appears
unchanged. Accordingly, it has been suggested that in the aftermath of
the decision in Robinson an effort would be made by defendants in slipand-fall cases to shift the summary judgment analysis to the first prong
of the Alterman Foods test-that is, whether the defendant had actual
or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance. 45 This shift is well
documented by the numerous slip-and-fall cases decided by the court of
appeals during recent survey periods.
There is some indication, however, that the analysis of the first prong
of the Alterman Foods test is slowly falling under the influence of
Robinson, as evidenced in part by the Georgia Court of Appeals decision
in Shepard v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.' s The decision in Shepard
focused on the proper application of the first prong of the Alterman
Foods test and the evidentiary burdens thereunder. In Shepard plaintiff

42. Id. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
43. 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
44. 268 Ga. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414. Notwithstanding the supreme court's
admonition in Robinson, there were still several decisions issued by the court of appeals
during the survey period in which summary judgment in favor of the defendant was
affirmed based upon the plaintiffs failure to exercise ordinary care for his or her own
safety. See Hall v. J.H. Harvey Co., 242 Ga. App. 315, 529 S.E.2d 444 (2000); Wood v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 187, 534 S.E.2d 556 (2000); Means v. Marshalls of
Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 532 S.E.2d 740 (2000); Gresham v. Bell's Food Mkt., Inc., 244 Ga.
App. 240, 534 S.E.2d 537 (2000).
45. See Hicks & McKinney, supra note 2, at 466-67.
46. 241 Ga. App. 746, 527 S.E.2d 36 (1999).
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entered defendant's supermarket, walked to the back of the store, and
then returned to the front of the store to secure a shopping cart. As
plaintiff was returning to the front of the store, she slipped and fell in
a puddle of water located next to a produce display. According to
plaintiff, none of defendant's employees were in the area at the time of
her fall. Moreover, plaintiff testified that she did not see the puddle
before she fell and did not know how long the puddle had been on the
floor prior to her fall.47
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
grocery store on the basis that defendant lacked actual or constructive
knowledge of the foreign substance. In support of its motion for
summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit from its location
manager, who described the inspection procedures utilized by defendant
and stated that those procedures were followed on the day of the
incident at issue.4" The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant.4 9
The court of appeals first noted that there was no evidence in the
record that defendant or any of its employees had actual knowledge of
the puddle that caused plaintiff's fall.5" Accordingly, the court of
appeals held that to establish constructive knowledge, plaintiff must
prove either that one of defendant's employees was in the immediate
area of the hazard and could have easily seen the substance or that the
substance remained on the floor for a sufficient period of time and
should have been discovered.51
Because there was no evidence that any of defendant's employees were
in the immediate area at the time of plaintiff's fall, the court of appeals
turned its analysis to the second method of establishing constructive
knowledge-whether defendant had reasonable inspection procedures in
place at the time of the incident.5 2 According to the court of appeals,
"Constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that
the owner lacked a reasonable inspection procedure. In order to
prevail at summary judgment based on lack of constructive knowledge,
the owner must demonstrate not only that it had a reasonable

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

746-47, 527 S.E.2d at 37-38.
746, 527 S.E.2d at 38.
749, 527 S.E.2d at 39.
747, 527 S.E.2d at 38.
747-48, 527 S.E.2d at 38.
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inspection program in place, but that such program was actually
carried out at the time of the incident."53
Moreover, a plaintiff is not required to show how long the hazard had
been on the floor until the owner or occupier of the premises has
demonstrated its inspection procedures.54 The trial court's grant of
summary judgment in this case rested upon the affidavit of defendant's
location manager. The court of appeals, however, found the affidavit
deficient.55 According to the court of appeals, "Affidavits submitted in
support of a motion for summary judgment must be based on personal
knowledge. Although an affidavit need not expressly state that it is
based on personal knowledge, it must at least reflect that its contents
are rooted in the affiant's personal knowledge and observation."56
The court of appeals then noted that, as defendant's location manager,
the affiant "would almost certainly have personal knowledge of the
general inspection procedures utilized by his store."57 However, that
same knowledge is not necessarily implied with respect to the inspection
procedures carried out on the day of the incident at issue.58 Insofar as
the affidavit did not recite that it was based on personal knowledge,
"and the contents [did] not reflect that he observed or had personal
knowledge of the inspection procedures carried out on that particular
day, Winn Dixie failed to meet its burden." 9
The court of appeals further noted that, even if the affidavit was not
deficient, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that the
inspection procedures in place were reasonable under the circumstances.6 ° The court set forth a number of different factors that should be
considered when evaluating what constitutes a reasonable inspection
procedure:
The length of time the substance must remain on the floor before the
owner should have discovered it and what constitutes a reasonable
inspection procedure vary with each case, depending on the nature of
the business, the size of the store, the number of customers, the nature
of the dangerous condition, and the store's location.6 '

53. Id. at 748, 527 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Avery v. Cleveland Ave. Motel, 239 Ga. App.
644, 645-46, 521 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1999)).
54. Id.
55. Id., 527 S.E.2d at 39.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Based on an evaluation of these factors, the court of appeals concluded
that the reasonableness of defendant's inspection procedures was for the
jury to determine.62
B.

Social Guest

Does the decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co.63 foreclose the trial
court's application of common sense in assessing whether a plaintiff has
exercised ordinary care for his or her own safety? Apparently so,
according to the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Waldo v. Moore.64
In Waldo plaintiff was a social guest in the home of defendant. After
breakfast one morning, plaintiff announced she was going to take a
shower. Apparently, defendant had raised the thermostat on the water
heater earlier that morning to wash clothes. Defendant, however, did
not tell plaintiff she had raised the thermostat.6 5 Plaintiff then
"entered the shower, turned on the hot water knob, and allowed the
water to begin flowing directly onto herself without testing it." 66 The
water flowing from the shower spout was approximately 130 degrees
Fahrenheit, and plaintiff was immediately scalded. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit against defendant for the second-degree burns sustained
in the shower. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant. 7
The court of appeals reversed.66
The court of appeals first noted that the duty owed by a homeowner
to a social guest is "to refrain from inflicting 'willful or wanton injury.,,,69 In short, the homeowner owes a duty to ensure the70premises do
"'not contain pitfalls, mantraps, and things of that type.'"
According
to plaintiff, defendant violated this duty by creating a "hiddenperil by
intentionally increasing the temperature of the hot water."7' Defendant
conceded that she intentionally raised the water temperature; however,
defendant argued plaintiff was still obligated to exercise "such prudence
as the ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation."72 In

62. Id. at 749, 527 S.E.2d at 39.
63. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
64. 241 Ga. App. 797, 527 S.E.2d 887 (2000).
65. Id. at 799, 527 S.E.2d at 888.
66. Id. at 800, 527 S.E.2d at 889 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
67. 241 Ga. App. at 797-99, 527 S.E.2d at 887-88.
68. Id. at 799, 527 S.E.2d at 888.
69. Id. at 798, 527 S.E.2d at 888.
70. Id. (quoting Mandeville Mills v. Dale, 2 Ga. App. 607, 610, 58 S.E. 1060, 1061
(1907)).
71. Id. at 799, 527 S.E.2d at 888.
72. Id.
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short, defendant contended that common sense dictated an ordinarily
careful person would not have stepped into the shower without first
testing the water. The court of appeals, however, concluded that, under
the authority of Robinson, whether plaintiff exercised ordinary care for
her own safety was an issue for the jury.73
Judge Phipps filed a dissent to the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Judge Johnson and Presiding Judge Andrews.74 According to the
dissent, the decision in Robinson did not mandate reversal of the trial
court's directed verdict:
Robinson is primarily concerned with the routine adjudication of
negligence issues. The question here is whether there is evidence of
wilfulness or wantonness. Alterman Foods v. Ligon was decided
because summary judgment on negligence issues in slip and fall cases
was being granted too infrequently. Because the pendulum had swung
too far in the opposite direction, Robinson was decided. Yet Robinson
recognizes that there are cases in which it can be held that, as a
matter of law, an invitee failed to exercise ordinary care for personal
safety. In my opinion, a competent adult who enters a shower, turns
the hot water knob, and allows the water to begin flowing directly onto
herself without testing it has, as a matter of law, failed to exercise
ordinary care for her own safety. In refusing to so hold, the majority,
rather than complying with Robinson, is swinging the pendulum back
to the pre-Alterman Foods era. I respectfully dissent.75

IV. CARRIERS
Over the last two survey periods, it has become apparent that the
76
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co. has

slowly started to work its way outside the narrow confines of slip-andfall law as described in Part III.A of this Article, and has begun to exert
its influence over a much broader spectrum of tort law. In Saltis v.
Daimler-Benz,vv the Georgia Court of Appeals continued this expansion
of Robinson to include within its scope issues of contributory or
comparative negligence in the context of a civil action against a public
carrier.78 At Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, shuttle trains
provide service between the multiple terminals and concourses.
However, unlike automatic elevators, automatic doors on the shuttle

73. Id.
74. Id. at 799-800, 527 S.E.2d at 889 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 802, 527 S.E.2d at 890 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
76.
77.

268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
243 Ga. App 603, 533 S.E.2d 772 (2000).

78. Id. at 604, 533 S.E.2d at 774-75.
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trains do not have any features to prevent the doors from closing on
passengers. Plaintiff was injured when the shuttle train doors at the
airport closed on him as he attempted to exit the train to prevent a
small child from leaving the shuttle. Although plaintiff was able to exit
the train, the doors caught his shoulder bag with his arm still in the
strap. As the train pulled away, plaintiff's arm was wrenched. Plaintiff
subsequently brought suit against the operator of the shuttle train.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the issues of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and lack of negligence. The trial court
granted defendant's motion.79 The Georgia Court of Appeals, however,
reversed. 0
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals first
held that defendant had a duty to exercise extraordinary care to protect
passengers based upon its status as a public carrier.81 According to the
court of appeals,
"A carrier of passengers is one that undertakes the transportation of
persons; a person or corporation who undertakes to transport or convey
persons from one place to another, gratuitously or for hire. Such a
carrier may be either a special or private carrier, or a public or
common carrier. To constitute a public conveyance a common carrier,
it is not necessary that it come within the definition of a public utility,
so as to be subject to the rules and regulations of a public utility
commission. ""
In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant offered the
affidavit of its operations manager at Hartsfield Airport. According to
the operations manager: "[Elvery time the train leaves the station 'an
audible warning is given that the train is leaving the station and that
passengers should prepare themselves' and 'passengers should watch for
the doors as they are closing.' 8'3 The court of appeals, however, held
that defendant had failed to set forth sufficient evidence to establish that
it had satisfied its duty to exercise extraordinary care to protect
passengers.8 4 The court of appeals rested its decision in part upon
certain deficiencies in the affidavit offered in support of defendant's
motion for summary judgment.85 According to the court of appeals, the

79. Id. at 603-05, 533 S.E.2d at 774-75.
80. Id. at 608, 533 S.E.2d at 774.
81. Id. at 605, 533 S.E.2d at 776.

82. Id. at 604, 533 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Scott v. Torrence, 69 Ga. App. 309, 319-20,
25 S.E.2d 120, 127 (1943)).
83. Id. at 606, 533 S.E.2d at 776.

84. Id. at 607, 533 S.E.2d at 776.
85. Id. at 606, 533 S.E.2d at 776.
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affiant "never testified that there existed a warning on the outside of the
train, that the doors would not reopen automatically.""6 Furthermore,
there was no evidence "that warnings were given 'that the doors do not
swing back"' or that all of the conditions and safety measures described
in the affidavit were in place on the day of the incident in question. 7
The court of appeals also noted that the injury suffered by plaintiff
was reasonably foreseeable and should have been anticipated by
defendant:
With the crowds of passengers with shoulder hanging bags, diaper
bags, or shoulder purses at the shuttle stops and on the trains at the
world's busiest airport, as well as the presence of young children,
defendant should have reasonably foreseen that a child or other person
would be at risk between the doors; that someone would attempt to
stop the doors from closing; or that the crowds would delay detraining
so that the doors would close on a body, clothing, or luggage with a
shoulder strap around a passenger being caught between the doors.88
Defendant, however, argued that summary judgment was appropriate
on the basis that plaintiff had failed to exercise ordinary care for his own
safety. Defendant argued that there were sufficient warnings the doors
would not re-open and that plaintiff ignored those warnings when he
attempted to exit the train while the doors were closing. 9 The court
of appeals, however, found there was sufficient contradictory evidence in
the record to suggest the warnings provided by defendant were not
sufficient to place a reasonable passenger on notice of the risk.9" In
this respect, the court of appeals held that Robinson should be extended
to cases involving automatic doors such as the case sub judice "so that
contributory or comparative negligence was a matter for
the passenger's
91
a jury."

86. Id.
87. Id. at 606-07, 533 S.E.2d at 776.
88. Id. at 605, 533 S.E.2d at 775.
89. Id. at 607-08, 533 S.E.2d at 777.
90. Id. at 608, 533 S.E.2d at 777.
91. Id. In extending the scope of Robinson to the facts in Saltis, the Georgia Court of
Appeals cited its 1998 decision in Scarbroughv. Dover Elevator Co., 232 Ga. App. 149, 500
S.E.2d 616 (1998). In Scarbrough plaintiff was injured when she tripped over a ledge
created when an elevator she was entering failed to stop at a position level with the floor.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, in part, on the basis that plaintiff failed to
exercise ordinary care for her own safety. Id. at 151-52, 500 S.E.2d at 617-18. Based upon
the standards established by the supreme court in Robinson, the court of appeals rejected
that argument. Id. at 153, 500 S.E.2d at 619. The circumstances giving rise to the injuries
in Saltis and Scarbrough, however, vary significantly. Nonetheless, the court of appeals
in Saltis made the determination that insofar as Robinson "applies to the automatic
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The significance of the court's reliance upon Robinson cannot be
overstated. Much effort has been made to confine, the decision in
Robinson to the second prong of the two-prong test adopted in Alterman
Foods, Inc. v. Ligon92 with respect to a plaintiff's burden of proof in a
foreign substance slip-and-fall case.93 It appears, however, that the
broad principles set forth by the supreme court in Robinson have now
slipped well beyond the confines of that narrow application and are
beginning to exert their influence on a much broader range of tort
actions.
V.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A.

Design Defects
Georgia's most notorious products liability case in recent years added
another chapter to its already "tortured and protracted"94 appellate
history during the survey period. In Ogletree v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp. ("Ogletree VIP'),95 plaintiff brought a wrongful
death action against the manufacturer of the cab and chassis of the
truck that killed her husband, alleging that the truck was defectively
designed because it did not have a back-up alarm.96 After a series of
appeals, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant under the
risk-utility test adopted in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.9' because
"Ogletree failed to present evidence that would support a finding that
alarm outweighed the
the risk of the cab and chassis without the
98
usefulness of the product in that condition."

The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of
appeals misapplied the standard for granting a motion for judgment

leveling of elevators as well as conditions of floors[,]... by extension such principles apply
to similar automatic doors, so that the passenger's contributory or comparative negligence
was a matter for a jury." 243 Ga. App. at 608, 533 S.E.2d at 777.
92. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
93. See supra Part III.A.
94. Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. ("Ogletree VI"), 236 Ga. App. 89, 89, 511
S.E.2d 204, 205 (1999).
95. 271 Ga. 644, 522 S.E.2d 467 (1999).
96. Id. at 644, 522 S.E.2d at 469. For the complete background of this epochal
litigation, see Hicks & McKinney, supra note 2, at 474-77, and Richard L. Sizemore,
Casenote, Ogletree v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.: The Demise of the
"Open and Obvious Danger"Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 643, 643-45 (1999).
97. 264 Ga. 732, 735, 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (1994).
98. 236 Ga. App. at 94, 511 S.E.2d at 208.
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notwithstanding the verdict."s A motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict should not be granted if there is any evidentiary support for
the verdict.'00 This inquiry requires an analysis of all the evidence as
well as 'any inferences that may be drawn from it. 10 Although there
was undisputed evidence that supported judgment for defendant, the
court of appeals erred because it disregarded other relevant evidence and
0 2
The court of appeals
possible inferences that supported the verdict."
hoped that its'decision would conclude this saga, but the supreme court,
with an air of exasperation, was compelled to "reject any unauthorized
shortcut around our jury system,"" 3 thus condemning the parties to
another round of appeals.
Ogletree VII is significant because it clarified the supreme court's
decision in Banks, which erected an almost insurmountable obstacle to
obtaining judgment as a matter of law in design defect cases. The riskutility test adopted in Banks makes judgment as a matter of law difficult
to obtain because it necessarily encompasses the concept of reasonableness, which ordinarily requires a jury determination, by weighing a
product's risk against its utility. 10 4 Therefore, Ogletree VII and Banks
signal that design defect cases typically are not susceptible to judgment
as a matter of law. Accordingly, as long as there is any evidence upon
which a verdict for either party could be based, judgment as a matter of
law is inappropriate if reasonable people could disagree as to whether
an inference of negligence should be drawn from the evidence.0 5
However, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if the defendant
adduces plain,0 6palpable, and indisputable evidence that the product is
not defective.
Thus, Ogletree VII begs the question of whether judgment as a matter
of law is ever proper in design defect cases involving overwhelming
0 7
evidence of the openness and obviousness of the product's danger.
Although the supreme court has stated that no factor should be

99. 271 Ga. at 646-47, 522 S.E.2d at 470-71.
100. Id. at 646, 522 S.E.2d at 469.
101. Id. at 647, 522 S.E.2d at 470.
102. Id. at 646-47, 522 S.E.2d at 470-71.
103. Id. at 647, 522 S.E.2d at 471.
104. Id. at 645, 522 S.E.2d at 469; see also Banks, 264 Ga. at 734, 450 S.E.2d at 673.
105. 271 Ga. at 647, 522 S.E.2d at 470.
106. Id. at 646, 522 S.E.2d at 470. The court noted that the risk-utility test imposes
an increased burden on defendants seeking judgment as a matter of law to make this
showing. Id.
107.

See generally DAVID J. MALESKI, GEORGIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY

& Supp. 1999).
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singularly dispositive under the risk-utility test,' it has also promised
that "Banks does not mean that adjudication as a matter of law 'is no
10 9
longer appropriate in any case in which a design defect is alleged."
However, because the risk-utility test is grounded in traditional
negligence principles, design defect cases are generally not susceptible
Nevertheless, evidence of the
to judgment as a matter of law."
openness and obviousness of a product's danger may, in certain
circumstances, be so overwhelming that it justifies judgment as a matter
of law."'
B.

Failureto Warn

In DeLoach v. Rovema Corp.,12 defendants were the successors to
the corporation that sold and serviced tea bagging machines manufactured by their German parent corporation. Plaintiff, an employee of
Tetley Tea Company, injured his hand in 1992 while attempting to clear
a paper jam in a tea bagging machine that defendants' predecessor sold
to Tetley in 1984. The evidence showed that plaintiff was aware of the

108. Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. ("Ogletree V"), 269 Ga. 443, 445, 500
S.E.2d 570, 572 (1998).
109. 271 Ga. at 646, 522 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Sharpnack v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc.,
223 Ga. App. 833, 834, 479 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1996) (en banc)).
110. See Rubin v. Cello Corp., 235 Ga. App. 250, 252, 510 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1998)
(reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment because "the open and obvious
nature of the product and the availability of an alternative design are not contiolling");
Zeigler v. CloWhite Co., 234 Ga. App. 627, 628-29, 507 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1998) (reversing
the trial court's grant of summary judgment because the openness and obviousness of the
product's danger is only one factor that affects the risk-utility analysis); Bodymasters
Sports Indus., Inc. v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170, 173, 501 S.E.2d 556, 560 (1998)
(affirming the trial court's denial of summary judgment because the openness and
obviousness of the danger was "not dispositive as to whether the machine was defective");
Raymond v. Amada Co., 925 F. Supp. 1572, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (denying summary
judgment because the openness and obviousness of the product's danger alone was not
determinative of the product's defectiveness).
111. See Morris v. Clark Equip. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (granting
summary judgment for defendant because the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that the
product's danger was objectively and subjectively open and obvious); see also Ogletree VII,
271 Ga. at 647-48, 522 S.E.2d at 471 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting) (arguing that "this is one
of those cases that demands judgment as a matter of law"); Raymond, 925 F. Supp. at 1578
(denying summary judgment, but noting that it is possible if "the evidence is plain and
indisputable"); cf.Sharpnack, 223 Ga. App. at 834-35, 479 S.E.2d at 436-37 (holding that
the decedent assumed the risk as a matter of law because the danger was objectively open
and obvious).
112. 241 Ga. App. 802, 527 S.E.2d 882 (2000).
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and he knew
risk of injury because he knew how the machine operated,
113
about similar incidents that had occurred in the past.
Plaintiff argued that the machine was defective because it lacked a
safety device that would have prevented his injury and that this defect
constituted a dangerous condition. He further argued that defendants
breached their duty to warn of this dangerous condition because they
failed to warn him after they became aware of it following a similar
the trial court granted summary
accident in 1987 or 1988. Nevertheless,
114
judgment for defendants.
Georgia law imposes different duties to warn on manufacturers and
sellers." 5 As the Georgia Court of Appeals observed, a manufacturer
has a duty to warn of a danger that it becomes aware of after the
product was sold, but a seller has no corresponding duty."' Instead,
Georgia law requires a seller to warn of a danger only if it had actual or7
constructive knowledge of the danger at the time it sold the product."
In contrast, the Restatement (Third)of Torts: ProductsLiability extends
this duty to require certain sellers to warn of dangers that come to their
attention after the date of sale." 8 Under Section 13 of the Restatement, a successor corporation has a postsale duty to warn of dangers
posed by products sold or distributed by the predecessor corporation if
the successor "undertakes or agrees to provide services for maintenance
or repair of the product," and if "a reasonable person in the position of
the successor would provide a warning.""' Factors for determining
whether a reasonable person in the successor's position would provide a
warning include (1) whether the successor knows or should know of the
product's danger; (2) whether consumers of the product can be identified
and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the danger; (3) whether
the successor can communicate the warning to consumers and consumers
can act accordingly; and (4) whether the product's12danger is sufficient to
justify imposing such a burden on the successor.

113. Id. at 802-03, 527 S.E.2d at 882-83.
114. Id. at 803-04, 527 S.E.2d at 882-83.
115. See id. at 804, 527 S.E.2d at 883; see also Battersby v. Boyer, 241 Ga. App. 115,
116-17, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162-63 (1999) (reaffirming that, although "a seller's duty to warn
consumers of a particular danger associated with the use of a product may be extinguished
when the manufacturer has already warned consumers of the particular danger at issue,"
a "consumer's challenge to the adequacy of the manufacturer's warning is not foreclosed").
116. 241 Ga. App. at 804, 527 S.E.2d at 883.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13 (1997).
Id. § 13(a)(1), (2).

120. Id. § 13(b)(1)-(4).
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Plaintiff argued that by citing Section 13 in Corbin v. Farmex,
Inc.,121 the Georgia Court of Appeals imposed a postsale duty to warn
on sellers.' 22 However, the court in DeLoach determined that Section
13 could not be a basis for finding defendants liable for failure to warn
because plaintiff was aware of the danger posed by the machine. 3
Additionally, the court distinguished Corbin on the ground that it
involved the successor to a company that manufactured and sold the
product as well as a defendant who neither knew nor reasonably should
have known about the defect.' 24 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court's decision, concluding that "Corbin should not be read as erecting
a post-sale 5duty to warn on the part of either a product seller or its
12
successor."
Another case involving the duty to warn, Fluidmaster, Inc. v.
Severinsen,126 is significant because it precludes an entire category of
claims. In that case a toilet in plaintiff's home overflowed, causing
damage to the property. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the toilet's
flush valve, alleging negligent manufacture, negligent design, strict
liability, and negligent failure to warn. The trial court dismissed all
claims except the failure to warn claim because they were barred by the
ten-year statute of repose. Defendant then moved for summary
judgment on the failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the
motion, and the Georgia Court of27Appeals granted defendant's application for an interlocutory appeal.
Plaintiff contended that defendant owed him a duty to warn that the
valve's seal would deteriorate over time under normal conditions. 28
The court of appeals disagreed and reversed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 29 Because manufacturers
have no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers, the court held that
defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to warn because "it is obvious that
the internal component parts of a device such as a toilet tank wear out
over time." 30 Thus, manufacturers have no duty to warn "[elven if the
risk of product failure as a result of normal wear and tear could be

121. 227 Ga. App. 620, 624, 490 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1997) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds sub non., Farmex Inc. v. Wainwright, 269 Ga. 548, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998).
122. 241 Ga. App. at 804, 527 S.E.2d at 883.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 804-05, 527 S.E.2d at 883-84.
126. 238 Ga. App. 755, 520 S.E.2d 253 (1999).
127. Id. at 755, 520 S.E.2d at 254.
128. Id. at 756, 520 S.E.2d at 255.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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characterized as a 'dangerous condition."" 1 This limitation on the
ability of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits based on a manufacturer's failure
to warn is especially important because the statute of repose does not
apply to such claims, which may not arise until years after the statute
expires." 2
In Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., ins plaintiffs sustained severe injuries
in an automobile crash involving a 1986 Ford Bronco II The driver
veered off the road slightly and lost control of the vehicle when he
attempted to return to the road by steering left. The driver then
attempted to regain control of the vehicle by steering right, but the
vehicle flipped and rolled over about two and a half times. Plaintiffs
sued, alleging that defendant failed to warn of the vehicle's dangerous
propensity to roll over. The district court granted summary judgment
for defendant, finding that the failure to warn claim was barred by the
statute of repose because
that claim was merely plaintiffs' design defect
34
claim in disguise.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's
decision was "contrary to the clear language of the statute and contrary
to the interpretation of that language by the courts of Georgia."'35 The
court explained that, although the statute of repose may bar a plaintiff
from bringing a design defect claim, Georgia law does not automatically
bar that plaintiff from bringing a failure to warn claim, even if the

131. Id.
132. See O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) (Supp. 2000) ("Nothing contained in this subsection shall
relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product
once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer."); Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga.
723, 727, 450 S.E.2d 208, 213 (1994) ("That '[n]othing' relieves a manufacturer from the
duty to warn reflects the legislature's recognition of the possibility that this duty may not
emerge until long after the statute of repose has extinguished any cause of action arising
out of the product's sale . . ").
133. 190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).
134. Id. at 1215-16. Plaintiffs also alleged that the vehicle was defectively designed
and that its defects caused it to roll over. Id. at 1215. The district court granted summary
judgment for defendant on this claim, finding that it was barred by the statute of repose
because plaintiffs filed the case more than ten years after the vehicle was first sold. Id.
at 1215-16. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed because factual issues existed as to
whether defendant's conduct constituted "willful, reckless or wanton disregard for property
or life," in which case the statute of repose would not apply. Id. at 1216-18; see also
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) ("The [statute of repose] shall also apply to the commencement of an
action claiming negligence of a manufacturer as the basis of liability, except an action
seeking to recover from a manufacturer for injuries or damages.., arising out of conduct
which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.").
135. 190 F.3d at 1219.
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failure to warn claim is predicated on dangers arising from the alleged
design defect.' 36
Turning to the record, the court noted that plaintiffs had introduced
evidence indicating that defendant was aware of the Bronco II's stability
problems and propensity to roll over at low speeds, especially after 1986,
yet defendant did not issue any postsale warnings about these dangers. 3 v Defendant countered that no warning would have prevented
plaintiffs' injuries because once plaintiffs decided to drive the vehicle, no
warning could have prevented it from rolling over.'38 However, the
court rejected defendant's argument as a misunderstanding of the duty
to warn.3 9 The duty to warn requires manufacturers (1) to apprise
consumers sufficiently of dangers associated with using a product, and
(2) to communicate adequately the warning to consumers. 4 ' Thus, the
law does not impose on manufacturers a duty to prevent accidents;
instead, it "merely requires the warning to inform the consumer of the
nature and existence of the hazard, allowing him to make an informed
decision whether to take on the risks warned of."'
Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate because a factual question existed as
4 2
to the sufficiency of the warning that defendant did provide.
In a final attempt to convince the court to affirm the district court's
decision, defendant argued that the warning it provided was sufficient
as a matter of law because its expert witness found that the same
warning was sufficient on other similar vehicles.'
However, the court
held that different (or more detailed) warnings may be required for
different products, regardless of how similar they are, because different
products may pose different dangers.'
Therefore, because a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant's warning was insufficient,
14
summary judgment was inappropriate.
C.

Expert Witness Testimony

In Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 146 the Georgia Court of
Appeals made three significant rulings concerning expert witness

136. Id. (citing Batten, 264 Ga. at 727, 450 S.E.2d at 213).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1220.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 240 Ga. App. 857, 524 S.E.2d 313 (1999), cert. granted.
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testimony. Plaintiff, her husband, and her daughter were involved in an
automobile crash when the left rear tire of their Ford Bronco II blew out,
causing Mr. Crosby, who was driving, to lose control of the vehicle,
which ultimately flipped over. The testimony at trial indicated there
was "an explosive, shotgun-like sound" immediately before Mr. Crosby
lost control. Plaintiff and her daughter sustained serious injuries, and
Mr. Crosby died. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the tire, and a jury
ultimately returned a verdict for defendant.'4 7
Less than one month before the crash, plaintiff had the right rear tire
replaced and the remaining tires rotated and balanced because the
vehicle had been shaking. Because the vehicle stopped shaking after
this service, plaintiff believed that the lack of balance, the need for
rotation, or misalignment of the tires had caused the shaking.
Therefore, when the vehicle began shaking again two days before the
crash, the Crosbys thought the problem was nothing more serious than
misalignment of the tires.'48
Plaintiff's first enumeration of error relating to expert witness
testimony was that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to
disregard testimony given by her expert witness about the cause of the
tire failure. Defendant did not object to this testimony during direct
examination, but during a recess following direct examination, defendant
moved to strike the testimony and to instruct the jury to disregard it on
the ground that the witness had failed to divulge certain of his opinions
during discovery. The trial court granted defendant's motion.'49
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding this testimony and that such abuse constituted
reversible error and required a new trial.'
The court reasoned that
defendant waived any objection by failing to object to the testimony at
the time the witness gave it.'
Finally, the court characterized
defendant's motion as a request for sanctions for discovery abuse, but
noted that excluding relevant evidence from trial is not an appropriate
remedy for such abuse.' 52

147. Id. at 857, 524 S.E.2d at 316.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 857-58, 524 S.E.2d at 316-17.
150. Id. at 859, 524 S.E.2d at 317.
151. Id. at 858, 524 S.E.2d at 317.
152. Id. "The appropriate remedies for discovery abuse are (1) postponement of trial
or recess of trial in progress, pending action to procure rebuttal evidence, or (2) a mistrial,
if there is no practical opportunity to make discovery and to obtain rebuttal evidence." Id.
at 858-59, 524 S.E.2d at 317; cf General Motors Corp. v. Blake, 237 Ga. App. 426, 427-31,
515 S.E.2d 166, 167-69 (1999) (en banc) (affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion for a continuance of the trial because defendant could not legitimately claim
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Plaintiff's second enumeration of error was that the trial court
erroneously disallowed impeachment of defendant's expert witness with
prior inconsistent opinions that his company offered in other cases
involving a Bronco that flipped over after a tire blew out and that he
considered in reaching his opinion in this case.' 53 The court of appeals
upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the different opinions
reached by other employees of the witness's company in similar cases
indicated impartiality, not bias or interest. 15 4 The court reasoned that
impeachment with the opinions of others is improper on cross-examination because such opinions are not prior statements by the witness. 5
However, if the witness had participated in a similar case in which one
of those opinions was used, impeachment with that opinion would have
been proper. 5 ' This reasoning reflects the fact that "[d]ifferent expert
witnesses can come to divergent opinions based upon the same
facts."'57 Nevertheless, the court advised plaintiff that on retrial she
could impeach the witness with the opinions of others employed by his
company if she did so on rebuttal rather than cross-examination.15 To
do so plaintiff would have to show (1) "sufficient substantial similarity"
between this case and the case in which the other opinion was rendered,
and (2) that the other opinion is subject to an exception to the hearsay
rule.159
Plaintiff's third enumeration of error was that the trial court
erroneously excluded expert witness testimony regarding public
awareness of the dangers resulting from tire vibration. 6 ' Although
the court of appeals conceded that such testimony became relevant as
rebuttal evidence because of evidence presented by defendant during its
case-in-chief, the court refused to reverse the trial court absent a
manifest abuse of discretion, apparently because the proposed testimony
would not have been helpful to the jury.'6'

surprise upon learning of the precise theory of liability to be advanced by plaintiffs expert
witness just three days before trial when (1) defendant did not describe how it was
surprised, and (2) defendant knew about the relevant facts and had an opportunity to
investigate them, but chose not to do so for tactical reasons).
153. 240 Ga. App. at 861, 524 S.E.2d at 319.
154. Id. at 861-62, 524 S.E.2d at 319.
155. Id. at 862, 524 S.E.2d at 319.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 863, 524 S.E.2d at 320.
161. Id.
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Preemption

In Gentry v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,162 plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action against Volkswagen after their daughter was
killed in an automobile crash. The automobile in which their daughter
was riding contained a fully passive restraint system, which consisted
of a passive two-point shoulder belt harness, a ramped seat, and a
deformable knee bolster. This system used the ramped seat and
deformable knee bolster instead of a lap belt. Plaintiffs argued that
Volkswagen's fully passive restraint system was defectively designed,
but the trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendant
because the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted
their wrongful death claim.'6
On appeal defendant argued that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208 impliedly preempted plaintiffs' claim because that
standard specifically allowed manufacturers to choose a fully passive
restraint system to satisfy the regulatory requirements for automobile
occupant protection; therefore, allowing plaintiffs' claim to proceed would
conflict with federal law.'6 To the extent that plaintiffs alleged that
the lack of a lap belt constituted a design defect, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that their claim was preempted. 165 However,
the court
166
found this view of plaintiffs' claim to be "overly simplistic."
Instead, the court characterized plaintiffs' claim as an assertion that
Volkswagen's particular design was defective. 167 Standard 208 did not
permit a manufacturer to use any fully passive restraint system, but
rather allowed that option only if the system met minimum performance
requirements." The court found that "[h]olding a manufacturer liable
where a fully passive restraint system failed to exceed this minimum
standard does not create a conflict [with federal law], but instead
dovetails with congressional intent."'69 Thus, the court held that
federally mandated minimum performance requirements do not preempt
state-law tort claims, even if the standard for state-law tort liability
requires manufacturers to design fully passive restraint systems that

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

238 Ga. App. 785, 521 S.E.2d 13 (1999).
Id. at 785-86, 521 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 787, 521 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 788, 521 S.E.2d at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This result is consistent

with the risk-utility test, under which compliance with federal regulations is ordinarily not a complete defense to liability for design defects,
but rather is just one of many factors to consider.'7'
The key to the court's decision was the distinction between claims
premised on the design of the fully passive restraint system and claims
172
premised on the manufacturer's decision to use such a system.
When federal law provides manufacturers with options, as Standard 208
did, only the latter type of claims will be preempted as conflicting with
the intent of the federal law. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
17
recently endorsed this view in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.

1

In that case plaintiffs alleged that the automobile was defectively
designed because it did not have a driver's side airbag.'74 The Court
held that plaintiffs' claim was preempted because it conflicted with the
objectives of Standard 208, which provided manufacturers with options
regarding airbags. 75 The Court reasoned that plaintiffs' claim depended on the manufacturer having a state-law duty to install an airbag in
the automobile. 7 Because Standard 208 did not require manufacturers to install airbags, a state-law duty to do so would have erected an
obstacle to the accomplishment of its objectives; therefore, the federal
law preempted plaintiffs' claim.177 The combined logic of Gentry and
Geier indicates that compliance with federal regulations will act as a
complete defense to liability for design defects if the claim is based on
the manufacturer's choice of options provided by federal law, but not if
the claim is based on the particular design chosen by the manufacturer.
VI. BOVINE JURISPRUDENCE
The area of bovine jurisprudence has, in large part, been ignored by
legal commentators. While the number of decisions do not as yet justify
their own survey article, it is an area of law that demands recognition
and analysis. Following in the hoof prints of such momentous decisions

170. Id.
171. Id. at 786, 521 S.E.2d at 16 (citing Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
267 Ga. 574, 577, 481 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1997)); see also Banks, 264 Ga. at 736 n.6, 450
S.E.2d at 675 n.6.
172. See 238 Ga. App. at 789, 521 S.E.2d at 17-18.
173. 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).
174. Id. at 1917.
175. Id. at 1925.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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as Watkins v. City of Toccoa, 7 ' Knight v. Addison,179 Simmons v.
Bearden, s ° Hollingsworth v. Thomas,' and Cone v. Shaffer,' the
Georgia Court of Appeals once again revisited this particular area of the
3
In Brock plaintiff
law in John Hewell TRucking Co. v. Brock.""
brought suit against defendant for property damage sustained when one
of its trucks collided with a cow owned by defendant. Plaintiff owned a
rental trucking business. On the day of the incident, one of its rental
trucks was traveling down Joe Chandler Road in Hall County, Georgia,
at approximately 5:00 a.m. when the truck struck a cow in the roadway.
The cow died. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the owner of
the cow. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
85
granted. 1" The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.'
On motion for summary judgment, defendant had set forth evidence
that the fencing around his pasture had been inspected prior to the
accident, that no holes or other openings had been found, and that he
checked his cattle daily by driving around his property. Moreover,
defendant testified in his deposition that no other cow belonging to him
had been killed in a roadway for at least ten years. In response,
plaintiff's president testified that he was aware of other incidents in
which cows had been found in the middle of Joe Chandler Road;
however, he could not offer any evidence that those cows belonged to
defendant. 6 Accordingly, the court of appeals held plaintiff had failed
to rebut the proof offered by defendant that he had exercised ordinary
care in the maintenance of his pasture and cattle. 7

178. 55 Ga. App. 8, 189 S.E. 270 (1936) (plaintiff injured when sanitary toilets on truck
fell on plaintiff as truck attempted to avoid cow in roadway).
179. 49 Ga. App. 54, 174 S.E. 145 (1934) (holding that mortgagee of cow purchased with
pension money of confederate veteran could levy execution on cow upon default).
180. 222 Ga. App. 430, 474 S.E.2d 250 (1996) (holding that failure to prove defendant
had refused to return cow was fatal to plaintiffs claim for damages).
181. 148 Ga. App. 38, 250 S.E.2d 791 (1978) (holding that ordinary risk of dairy
business includes cows unexpectedly swishing their tails).
182. 146 Ga. App. 472,246 S.E.2d 714 (1978) (holding that issue as to whether removal
of dead calf from uterus of cow should have been accomplished while dead calf was whole
or through dissection was jury question precluding summary judgment).
183. 239 Ga. App. 862, 522 S.E.2d 270 (1999).
184. Id. at 862-63, 522 S.E.2d at 271-72.
185. Id. at 864, 522 S.E.2d at 273.
186. Id. at 863, 522 S.E.2d at 272.
187. Id. at 864, 522 S.E.2d at 273. In retrospect, the claim in Brock may very well
have been a preemptive strike to prevent the filing of a claim against plaintiff rental
company for the death of the cow. See Southern Ry. v. Freeman, 58 Ga. App. 403, 403, 198
S.E. 717, 717 (1938) (concerning "suit by the plaintiff against the defendant railway for the
killing of one of his cows [on the track]").
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